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A MODEL JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
<Jerald <Junther*
JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: C:mEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND
THE ZIONIST CENTURY. By Pnina Lahav. Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 314. $29.95.
I have long been a fan of the Michigan Law Review's annual
book review issue. I was therefore particularly delighted to read
the Introduction to last year's issue, the twentieth anniversary of
this ingenious and, I think, unique law review format. Michigan
professor Carl Schneider wrote that opening piece.1 Schneider
brought excellent credentials to the writing of his witty and
thoughtful essay: he was Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review twenty
years ago, and thus present at the creation of the book review issue.
His thoughtful Introduction states, accurately I believe, that the
book review issue "is the best read issue of any law review in the
country."2 He recalls the initial goals of the format and offers per
suasive suggestions for future ones. He points out that one of the
purposes of the book review issue is to "serV'e the readers," stating:
"[B]ecause there is now so much published, no one can read every
thing; and because much of it is not good, no one would want to.
Book reviews, then, help their readers decide which books to buy,
which to read, and which to study."3 I agree with his observation,
as I especially do with his comment that "often a serious book goes
unreviewed for several years because it was overlooked in the
flood" of new books.4 The inattention to Pnina Lahav's5 biography
of Simon Agranat in this country vividly illustrates Schneider's
remark about books that have been overlooked.
The silence of American newspapers and periodicals has been
stunning. The New York Review of Books, The New York Times,
other major newspapers and magazines of general circulation none have reviewed the book.6 Attention to the book in American
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, StanfordUniversity. A.B.
Brooklyn; M.A. 1950, Columbia; LL.B. 1953, Harvard. - Ed.

1949,

1. Carl E. Schneider, The Book Review Issue: An Owner's Guide, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1363
(1998).
2. Id. at 1375.
3. Id. at 1368.
4. Id. at 1373.
5. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
6. The only serious press evaluations of the book I have found are in foreign newspapers:
e.g., enthusiastic reviews in Israel's English language daily, the Jerusalem Post, and one in
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publications consists only of a favorable review by Sanford
Levinson in the History Book Club Review7 and an extensive,
enthusiastic evaluation by Laura Kalman, a knowledgeable and
thoughtful biographer herself,8 in Law and Social Inquiry, the Jour
nal of the American Bar Foundation.9 Kalman, who had written a
blurb for Judgment in Jerusalem
a blurb beginning "[t]his is the
best biography I have ever read" - superbly surveys the pitfalls
that confront a biographer and evaluates Lahav's achievement far
more thoroughly than I can here. She ends her forty-five-page
essay with the statement: "I wish my blurb had been more
glowing."10
-

I fully share Kalman's enthusiasm. I, too, am convinced that
Pnina Lahav has written a truly superb book. Her biography of
Simon Agranat tells an enormously gripping story of one human
being's life and, at least as important (but rare), depicts her subject
with continuous attention to the context of the rich history that
affected him and that he affected. As a result, this is not only a
portrait of an intriguing individual but also a sophisticated, nuanced
depiction of the strains and divisions that have marked the history
of Zionism, of Israel, and of Israeli law. Moreover, the book is a
great read.
I suspect that most readers of this book review issue have never
heard of Simon Agranat and are neither Zionists nor especially
interested in the history of Israel. This review is an effort to per
suade you not to let these considerations stand as obstacles to your
decision to read this book. I speak from personal experience; I, too,
had not heard of Agranat and was not steeped in Israeli history.
My major field is American constitutional law, not comparative
constitutional law. I am a Jew, a refugee from Nazi Germany in the
late 1930s. The German Jewish culture of my youth left me no leg
acy that would turn me into a devoted Zionist. My acquaintance
with Israel is less than a decade old - only two visits, one to attend
a conference,11 the other to give a lecture12 - after years of travel
to many other foreign countries. Yet I was overwhelmed by
German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. See Allen E. Shapiro, Jewish Justice in the Promised
Land, JERUSALEM PoST, Dec. 4, 1997, at 9, and FRANKFURTER ALl.GEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar.
1998, at 11.
7. See Sanford Levinson, HISTORY BooK CLUB REVIEW (June 1998).
8. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990).
9. See Laura Kahpan, The Power of Biography, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 479 (1998).
10. Id. at 524.
11. International Conference, The Nature and Legitimacy of Judicial Review, The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December, 1994.
12. Gerald Gunther, The Art and Craft of Judging in the United States: Reflections of
Judge Learned Hand's Biographer (Louis D. Brandeis Memorial Lecture, Israel Academy of
Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem) (Jan. 14, 1997).

20,
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Lahav's riveting book. My enthusiasm stems mainly from the fact
that I am an aficionado of biographies, including but not limited to
judicial biographies. , In view of my very limited familiarity with
Agranat and with Israel, I was stunned by my immediate absorption
in Lahav's book.
This review, then, is an effort to bring to the attention of the
readers of this year's book review issue a truly worthy and capti
vating book that richly illuminates many issues of considerable
interest to American readers. This effort to shine a spotlight on an
egregiously neglected book was spurred by a phone call from an
editor on the Michigan Law Review asking me to review any or all
of the biographies of American judges published recently. I replied
that I was familiar with all the biographies, for I had read them in
the course of serving as chair of the Supreme Court Historical
Society's Committee on the Griswold Prize, an award for the best
book relating to the Supreme Court.1 3 Reluctant to review books
that I had already discussed at length with my committee col
leagues, I suggested to the editor that I instead review the Agranat
biography that I had just begun to read, for I was finding it to be the
best I had encountered in a very long time. The editor, understand
ably, had never heard of Agranat or indeed the author; but, per
haps inspired by Carl Schneider's introductory essay last year,
agreed to discuss it with his co-editors, who ultimately approved my
suggestion.
I am writing this review because I remain convinced, after two
readings, that Judgment in Jerusalem is indeed a remarkable
achievement. My fervor is not diminished by another emotion that
surfaced intermittently as I immersed myself in it. I had worked for
many years on a biography of Learned Hand,14 in which I sought to
interweave my subject's personal makeup, historical context, and
public work, and to present my story in as readable a manner as I
could. I am proud of my book, but I must acknowledge that
Lahav's book, written with dazzling fluency and grace, nuance and
thoughtfulness, is to me the model biography. And to fuel my envy
some more, her book on Agranat is less than half the length of mine
on Hand! This envy has also driven my interest in writing this
essay: my Hand biography attracted a great deal of attention in the
American media; I was truly disturbed that Lahav's book has been
so widely ignored here and is hence unknown to most legal academ
ics, to lawyers and students, and to fellow fans of biographies.1 5
13. Our committee recommended that the award go to Andrew Kaufman for his fine
biography of Cardozo: .ANoREw L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
14. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) [hereinafter
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND].
15. I fear that I have taken so much space with these personal reflections that I may not
be able to do justice to the attractions of this book. If my advocacy for this distinguished
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* * *

Why then do I find this book so outstanding? In my view,
superb biographies are often the product of special connections
between biographer and subject. Lahav and Agranat are an espe
cially promising match. Her Prologue notes the irony "in the fact
that Agranat and I have traded places. Born in America to Russian
immigrant parents, he made his home in Israel. I was born in Tel
Aviv to parents from Iran and Egypt and m&de my home in the
United States" (p. xvii). Lahav has special reason to understand
what it is to be an immigrant, as Agranat was; both became firmly
rooted in two cultures, Israeli and American. Lahav has been a
member of the Boston University law faculty for two decades.
American constitutional law is her specialty, but her early immer
sion in Israeli life and culture and her continuing interest in Israeli
events assure a surefooted depiction of the strands and strains in
Israeli law and politics. Her rootedness in two countries could not
alone guarantee a book as good as this one, to be sure. It must be
her remarkable perceptiveness and her gifts for engagingly lucid
and nuanced prose that were essential to fashioning a book of this
admirable quality.
The central theme of Lahav's biography is, of course, the life of
her subject, Simon Agranat. But in her skillful hands, that life
becomes a revealing prism through which to portray and evaluate
the history and culture of the country in which Agranat spent most
of his life. His life, unlike that of any other Israeli Justice, began in
the United States. Lahav's skillful portrayal of his American years
introduces some of the themes that permeate the entire book. Born
in Louisville in 1906, the young Agranat spent most of his first
twenty-four years in Chicago. It was in Chicago that he developed
two pervasive interests: Zionism and the American Progressive
movement. To resolve any conflict between Agranat's American
ism and his Zionism, he followed the advice of Louis Brandeis: "To
be better Americans we must become better Jews, and to be better
Jews we must become better Zionists" (p. 18). In high school, he
became Editor-in-Chief of a monthly Zionist magazine. When the
American Zionist movement split between those who followed
Louis Brandeis and those who followed Chaim Weizmann,
Agranat's sympathies clearly lay with Brandeis, but he did not
openly challenge his Zionist father's clear devotion to Weizmann.
After a brief, failed migration in 1922 to Israel - then Palestine, a
British Mandate - Agranat and his family returned to Chicago,
where he attended the University of Chicago for his undergraduate
and law degrees. His enthusiasm for the Progressive movement
biography leaves any reader in doubt, I strongly urge a reading of Kalman's persuasive evalu
ation, supra note 9.
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was greater than ever. Robert M. LaFollette, Agranat's hero even
in high school, gained his support in the 1924 presidential campaign,
even though Agranat was not yet old enough to vote. After his
admission to the Illinois Bar in 1930, Agranat left Chicago for New
York to board a ship for Palestine - his parents had migrated there
a few months earlier, and Simon followed them.
As I read Lahav's absorbing account of Agranat's American
years, I thought· - not for the last time - of similarities between
Lahav's subject, Simon Agranat, and mine, Learned Hand.
Agranat's private reservations about his father's strong support of
Zionism a la Weizmann reminded me not only of Hand's struggle
for youthful independence from his strong, rigid father but also of
his reluctance to yield to family pressures that he go to law school
rather than pursue graduate study in philosophy. An even more
striking parallel is that Hand, three decades older than Agranat,
was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Progressive movement.
Indeed, no political cause stirred Hand as much in his life as Teddy
Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign of 1912, the campaign that
pushed the Progressives into national prominence. Hand was
already a judge by then, yet he felt so strongly about the cause that
he served as an adviser to Roosevelt; and a year later, he permitted
his name to be entered in the 1913 campaign for the Chief Judge
ship of New York State's highest court in order to further Progres
sive ideals. The younger Agranat, by contrast, did not have
occasion to become enchanted by the Progre,ssives until the 1920s,
when Robert LaFollette was the presidential candidate. Eastern
Teddy Roosevelt Progressives such as Hand were not enthusiastic
allies of the Party members from the West, for the Western faithful
seemed too populist as well as too lacking in the rigor and hard
headedness that those in the East cherished. At a minimum, then,
Agranat and Hand, in their affiliations with the Progressive move
ment, were lawyers whose values and goals extended well beyond
material gains.
Agranat's move to Palestine meant· that the young Illinois law
yer had to engage with a chaotic legal system: Ottoman law- still
provided a good part of the structure;- British law slowly left its
imprints; and law books, including reports of judicial decisions,
were not yet readily available. But Agranat was determined to
remain, and his perseverance succeeded: after ten years of private
practice, he was named a magistrate in 1940. By the time the State
of Israel was formed in 1948 and the new State's judicial posts had
to be filled, the experienced Agranat was an attractive choice.
Soon, he was appointed as Chief District Judge for Haifa; six
months later, in January 1949, he became a Justice of the new na
tion's Supreme Court.
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Agranat served as a Justice of the Israel Supreme Court until
1976; for the last eleven years of this tenure, he was the Chief Jus
tice. His major opinions bear some resemblance to John Marshall's
in the early days of American national history, for Agranat too was
writing on a clean slate and his approach became a keystone in the
development of Israeli law. Many of his rulings dealt with major
issues in the growth of the state. I will not try to address most of
them; Lahav's informative book and Kalman'.s extensive review do
that job well.
* * *

Similarities in the judicial work of Agranat and Hand had par
ticular resonance for me, in view of my recent work on the Hand
biography. In her book, Lahav speaks of Agranat's "uncommonly
long" opinions (p. 69), a trait with which Hand is not readily identi
fied. But in explaining Agranat's almost obsessive efforts to tackle
every issue in a case, she offers an explanation that applies equally
to the modest, self-doubting Hand. She says: "Sensitive to the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine, to the two sides of each coin, he
needed to persuade himself that his result was justified. He felt
compelled to expose the process of legal deliberation in order to
feel at peace with the result " (p. 69). Moreover, the similarity to
Hand emerges from the substance of Agranat's analysis in some of
the cases.
Nowhere is this parallel clearer than in one of the most influen
tial and well-known Agranat opinions, Kol Ha-am v. Minister of the
Interior.16 The Kol Ha-am case involved the Interior Minister's
temporary ban on the publication of two Communist newspapers.
The Government's ban was based on· a law enacted during the
British Mandate period, in 1933, authorizing the Minister to sus
pend publication "if any matter appearing in a newspaper is, in [his]
opinion . . . likely to endanger the public peace. "17 The challenged
articles were published in March 1953, at the height of the Cold
War. The stimulus was a later discredited story in a leading Israeli
newspaper that Israel's Ambassador to Washington, Abba Eban,
had expressed his country's readiness to provide 200,000 Israeli
troops in the event of a war between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The criticism of this report by the Stalinist newspa
pers asserted, for example, that:
16. Kol Ha-am v. Minister of Interior, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF TIIE SUPREME CouRT
lsRAEL 90 (1953) (English translation of 7 P.D. 871) (hereinafter Kol Ha-am]. Lahav
discusses the case at pp. 107-12 of her book; see also her earlier, fuller discussion in Pnina
Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence ofFree Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
21, 27-61 (1981).

OF

17. Kol Ha-am, supra note 16, at 91-92 (quoting newspaper article originally printed in
KuL HA'AM, 1953).

May
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[T]he masses in Israel know that the Soviet Union is faithful to the
policy of the brotherhood of peoples in peace.. ..If Abba Eban or
anyone else wan� to go and fight_ on the side of the American war
mongers, let him go, but go alone. The masses want peace and
national independence .... Let us increase our struggle against the
anti-national policy of the Ben-Gurion government, which is speculat
1
ing on the blood of Israel youth.8
Agranat's Kol Ha-am ruling held the Minister's ban illegal.
The episode "that this story brought to mind was of course the
setting of the Masses case, a very important case decided by then
District Judge Learned Hand in 1917, 1 9 soon after the outbreak of
World War I and the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. The
Masses, a pacifist, strongly left-leaning magazine, admired those
who refused to enlist in the American armed forces or who opposed
the draft. New York City's Postmaster promptly issued an order
banning The Masses from the mail,20 and The Masses went to
Hand's court to seek an injunction against the ban. In 1917, no
major First Amendment case had ever been before the U.S.
Supreme Court, so that Hand had $Orne room to consider the issue
without the confinements of precedents. Hand ruled against the
Postmaster, thereby risking (and ultimately losing) his possible ele
vation to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.21
The factual settings of the Kol Ha-am and Masses cases were
obviously quite similar. .In each situation, the Government sought
to suppress publications that criticized its policies. In the United
States, Congress has passe� a law that, for the first time in more
than a century, sought fo inhibit speech critical of the government.
Most of the public, caught up iri patriotism and enthusiastic support
for the ongoing war, no doubt supported the law. In Israel, a
British Mandate ordinance, continued by the new State of Israel,
provided the basis for the press ban. In neither country could the
court ruling have pleased the general public. Yet the judges struck
down the prohibitions.
Hand and Agranat were not crusading judges; indeed, they were
typically opposed to interventions in policy disputes by overly
activist judges. Moreover, Hand was by nature filled with self
doubt and skepticism not only about himself but about exercising
18. Id.
19.
1917).

at 93.
Masses Publg. Co. v. Patten,

244 F. 535

(S.D.N.Y.

1917) revd., 245 F. 102 (2d

Cir.

20. Tue Espionage Act declared "unmailable" publications made illegal by the Act. Tue
New York Postmaster's ban was ordered by the Postmaster General. See Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 723 (1975); GUNTHER, LEARNED !IAND, supra note 14, at 15160.
21. A unanimous Court of Appeals promptly overturned Hand's ruling.
Publg. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).

See

Masses
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judicial review as well. He was an early opponent of Lochner v.
New York22 and the Lochnerizing era to which it gave birth, and
those abuses of judicial review made him averse to drastic rulings
for the rest of his life.23 True, Hand was sitting in a country where
the courts' power to review the constitutionality of executive or leg
islative action had been clearly established more than a century ear
lier. Agranat, on the other hand, was adjudicating in a nation
notoriously beset, then and now, by national security concerns.
And Israel, unlike the United States, lacked then (and still lacks
today) a written constitution. Israel's national legislature, the
Knesset, is theoretically supreme, and Agranat had no ready basis
to fashion an Israeli counterpart to Marbury v. Madison24 out of the
clay of parliamentary supremacy.
Yet both judges handed down rulings of lasting significance to
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. To me, the most
striking parallel between Agranat and Hand is the way they
reached their decisions. Neither Agranat nor Hand purported to be
handing down a constitutional decision. Instead, each ruling was
based, on the face of it, on statutory interpretation, the far more
traditional task of judges. Yet both Agranat and Hand, through
their apparently modest rulings, contributed greatly to the constitu
tional development of their nations.
The analytical methodology of these two judges warrants fuller
elaboration. Hand's Masses opinion clearly asserts at the outset
that the constitutionality of the congressional legislation was not at
issue in this case; only the reach of the statute, the law's "meaning,"
was involved.25 Central to his statutory interpretation was his reli
ance on the premises of a democratic regime. Thus, he emphasized
that, normally, disagreement with government policy falls "within
that right to criticise either by temperate reasoning, or by immoder
ate and indecent invective, which is normally the privilege of the
individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opin
ion as the ultimate source of authority."26 Later in his opinion he
- stated that:
It would contradict the normal assumption of democratic government

that the suppression of hostile criticism does not tum upon the justice
of its substance or the decency and propriety of its temper. Assuming
that the power to repress such opinion may rest in Congress in [war
time] ... its exercise is so contrary to the use and wont of our people
22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. 244 F. at 538.
26. 244 F. at 539.

73-74 (1958).
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that only the clearest expression of such power justifies the conclusion
that it was intended.27

And so he found no such repressive intent here.
Hand did recognize that there was a limit to critical expressions.
Advocating an incitement standard, he stated:
[T]o assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to
violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of agita
tion which in normal times is a safeguard of free government.. . . If
one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to
have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the test, I can see
no escape from the conclusion that under this [law] every political
agitation which can be shown to be apt to create a seditious temper is
illegal. I am confident that by such language Congress had no such
revolutionary purpose in view.2s

Agranat reached a result vecy similar to Hand's in his Kol
opinion, through a route akin to Hand's.29 Like Hand, he
articulated the presuppositions of a democratic system and empha
sized the importance of freedom of expression. But when Hand
articulated "the normal assumption of democratic government,"30
he could implicitly rely on the existence of a written constitution,
with its explicit protection of freedom of speech in its First
Amendment. Agranat had no such foothold. Instead, he, even
more daringly and ingeniously, pointed instead to Israel's Declara
tion of Independence of 1948 and drew from it the values central to
Israel as a democratic as well as Jewish state. Prior to Agranat's
ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court had refused to use the Declara
tion as a legal source. Agranat insisted that, since the Declaration
expressed '"the vision of the people and its faith,' we are bound to
pay attention to the matters set forth in it, when we come to inter
pret [the] laws of the State."31 In short, Kol Ha-am, without openly
challenging the supremacy of the legislature, did exactly what Hand
had done in Masses: read into the interpretation of laws the basic
presuppositions of a democratic deliberative society. Lahav views
the case as a major, first step in making the Israeli judiciary the
guardian of individual rights and characterizes this aspect of
Ha-am

27. 244 F. at 540.
28. 244 F. at 540.
29. Although Agranat was familiar with, and often drew upon, the work of American
judges and scholars, see generally Lahav, supra note 16, and indeed sometimes quoted Hand,
there is no evidence that he knew of the Masses case.
30. Masses, 244 F. at 540.
31. Kol Ha·am, supra note 16, at 105. The Declaration stated, inter alia, that the State of
Israel "will be based on freedom, justice and peace" and "will guarantee freedom of religion,
conscience, language, education and culture." Declaration of the Establishment of the State
of Israel, 1 l.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
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Agranat's opinion as "a bold leap" that possessed "radical poten
tial" (p. 111).
It is that strikingly parallel methodology of Agranat and Hand,
that reliance on statutory interpretation imbued by a nation's basic
norms, that caught my eye. But both Kol Ha-am and Masses had
significant institutional and constitutional consequences as well.
Agranat's "bold leap" has provided the basis for his successors'
considerably greater activism: several of modem Israel's Supreme
Court Justices have found the Declaration's emphasis that the
nation is a democratic as well as a Jewish state a very useful spring
board for judicial interventions that the aging Agranat probably
would not have endorsed.32
Hand, too, did not write his parallel Masses opinion as a consti
tutional one. Yet he clearly hoped - in a rare venture into novel
constitutional interpretation - that his incitement test would
become the constitutional standard. In the years immediately fol
lowing the 1917 Masses ruling, he frequently tried to spread the
message of Masses, even though the Second Circuit had promptly
repudiated it. In letters to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
Harvard scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in particular, he persisted in
advancing his approach. But in Schenck v. United States,33 the
Court adopted the clear and present danger standard, a standard
Hand considered an inadequate protection of expression. A few
months after Schenck, the Holmes dissent in Abrams v. United
States34 placed greater emphasis on the immediacy of the danger
caused by speech and thus put greater bite into clear and present
danger. Hand was still not satisfied, but the Supreme Court was not
inclined to move to an incitement approach. By the early 1920's,
32. The modem Israeli Supreme Court has impressed me as perhaps the most activist in
the world, even though (or perhaps because) it still operates without a complete written
constitution. I first formed that impression in 1994, when I attended a conference which
included Justices from the German, Canadian, American as well as Israeli Supreme Court.
See supra note 11. My enhanced attention to the Israeli Supreme Court's work since this first
visit to Israel has strengthened my impression. For example, the modem Court has "effec
tively abolish[ed]" standing requirements and "seriously erod[ed] the 'justiciability' (political
question) doctrine." See Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics ofRights in Israeli Constitutional Law,
in lsRAEL STUDIES, vol. 3, no. 2 (Pnina Lahav, Guest Editor, Fall 1998), 80, 85. Moreover,
the Israeli Supreme Court has rendered rulings quite startling to American eyes - e.g.,
ordering the Speaker of the Knesset, Israel's parliament, not to remove a racist bill from the
Knesset's agenda, H/C 742, Kahana v. Speaker of the Knesset, 39(4) P.D. 85 (1984), and
ordering the Prime Minister to remove from his Cabinet a minister who had been indicted on
criminal charges, H/C 3094, Ha-tenua le-maan eichut ha-shilton v. Government of Israel,
47(5) P.D. 426 (1993). For a recent defense of the Israeli Supreme Court's stance by its Chief
Justice, see Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, in ISRAEL STUD·
IES, supra, at 6; for a critical evaluation of the Court's directions, see Aeyal M. Gross, in
ISRAEL STUDIES, supra, at 88-92 (on the role of Israel's Basic Laws of 1992 in enhancing the
Israel Supreme Court's powers) and 97-101 (fearing the "Lochnerization" of Israeli constitu
tional law).
33. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
34. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Hand concluded that he had "not much hope that my own views as
stated in the Masses case would ever be recognized as law."35
But Hand was wrong. Eight years after he died in 1961, the
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio36 adopted Hand's incite
ment emphasis as a central ingredient of a more speech-protective
interpretation of the First Amendment. 37
* * *

Agranat's greatest legacy to Israeli law was probably uninten
tional. Recent Chief Justices have led its Supreme Court in turning
Israel's Declaration of Independence into a tool legitimating the
judicial crafting of a jurisprudence of rights. As Lahav notes, this
modem resurrection of Agranat's legacy of the 1950s has "pushed
its frontiers beyond [his] wildest imagination" (p. 252). Lahav's
book thus provides sophisticated background for an understanding
of such contemporary crises as the beleaguered state of the
Supreme Court itself. Today's Chief Justice, the brilliant Aharon
Barak, has to operate under military guard and has been labeled
"an enemy of the Jews."38 Even more recently, the religious leader
of Israel's ultra-Orthodox Shas Party denounced the Justices as
"wicked . . . empty-headed and wanton evildoers"who are "unclean
and desecrate the Sabbath."39 On February 14, 1999, some 250,000
ultra-Orthodox Jews participated in demonstrations that attacked
the "tyranny"of the Supreme Court.40 This controversy is in tum a
reflection of the ongoing conflict between Orthodox Jews on the
one hand and non-Orthodox and secular ones on the other. An
observer might well suspect that the greatest threat to the survival
of the State of Israel lies in conflicts among Jews rather than in
35. Letter from Learned Hand to Walter Nelles (April 20, 1923) (quoted in Gunther,
supra note 20, at 750. Even earlier, Hand had written to Holmes that achieving Supreme
Court adoption of the Masses approach seemed a hopeless venture: "I bid a long farewell to
my little toy ship which set out quite bravely on the shortest voyage ever made." Letter from
Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Mar. 1919) quoted in Gunther, supra note 20,
at 739.
·

More than three decades after Abrams, Hand, in his Second Circuit opinion in Dennis v.
United States 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd., 341U.S. 494 (1951), applied (and appeared to
dilute) the clear and present danger test, largely because he felt bound by Supreme Court
precedents endorsing the Schenck-Abrams standard. See GERALD GUNTIIBR, CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 1041 n.3 (12th ed. 1991). Even at the time of Dennis, however, he privately
thought his Masses standard was preferable. GUNTIIBR, LEARNED HAND, supra note 14, at
604.
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TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at A23.
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disputes between Israelis and Palestinians or other peoples of the
Middle East.
* * *

This illustration of the contemporary value of Lahav's fascinat
ing book comprises only a small part of its contents. Her biography
touches on virtually every major theme affecting Israel's history, for
Agranat's long tenure produced rulings involving all of them: the
tensions between catastrophe Zionism and utopian Zionism (e.g.,
pp. 185-94); the impact of the Holocaust, especially confronted by
Agranat in the Kaszmer (pp. 121-44) and Eichmann cases (pp. 14562); the "Who Is a Jew?"controversy (pp. 196-220). The continuing
interest of Americans in issues such as these - issues explored by
Lahav with such rare skill - helps explain the extraordinary rich
ness of this book.
This biography is truly a feast. Permit yourself to be nourished
by it!

